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226 PEOPLE tI. SHIPMAN 
[Crim. No. 8365. In Bank. Jan. 15, 1965.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. 
RICHARD SHIPMAN, Defendant and Appellant. 
[la, 1b] Oriminal Law-Writ of Error Ooram Nobil~lho'1lD.C18.-·o'. 
A writ of coram nobis is granted only when the petitioner 
shows that some fact existed which, without his fault or 
negligence, was not presented to the trial court on the merits, 
and if presented. would have prevented rendition of the judg- . 
ment, that the newly discovered evidence does not go to the 
merits of issues tried, and that he did not know and could not 
have discovered with due diligence the facts on which he, 
relies substantially sooner than the time of his motion for the 
writ. 
[2] Id.-Writ of Error Ooram Nobfs.-.:.Grounds.-The requirement· 
of showing in a petition for a writ of coram nobis that newly' 
discovered evidence does not go to the merits of issues tried 
applies even though the evidence is not discovered until 
the time to move for a new trial has elapsed or the motion 
been denied. 
[3] Id.-Writ of Error Ooram Nobis-Proceedings.-When facta 
are alleged with sufficient particularity to show that there are 
substantial legal or factual issues on which availability of the. 
writ of coram nobis turns, the court must set the matter for 
hearing. ' 
[4] ld.-Writ of Error Ooram Nobis-Proeeedings.-Legal or 
tual issues on which availability of the writ of coram fIObia 
turns may be decided on the basis of memoranda of points and 
authorities, affidavits, and other written reports j where the 
court deems additional procedures necessary to 
determine the issues, it may also require the presence 
petitioner and other witnesses and conduct the hearing as 
ordinary trial. 
[6] !d.-Writ of Error Ooram Nobis-Proceedings.-Neither the 
U.S. Constitution nor California law require that the hearing . 
on petition for a writ of coram nobis be conducted as a formal . 
trial. 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Coram Nobis, § 11 j Am.Jur.2d, Coram Nobis~l 
and Allied Statutory Remedies, § 13. '~ 
lI/[cK .. Dig. References: [1, 2] Criminal Law, § 1038.5(1) j [3, 5]:~ 
Criminal Law, § 1038.7(1) j [4] Criminal Law, §§ 1038.7(1), ; 
1038.7(6) j [6] Criminal Law, § 1038(2) j [7] Criminal Law,; 
§ 1038(1) j [8] Criminal Law, § 1038.7(7); [9-13] Criminal Law,; 
§ 1038.7(8) j [14, 15] Criminal Law, § 1038.5(3) j [16] Criminal. 
Law, § 1038.7(3). 
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[6] ld.-Writ of Error Coram Nobis-Nature of Writ.-Coram 
fIObis must be regarded as part of the proceedings in the 
criminal ease. 
(7] ld.-Writ of Error Coram Nobis.-Coram nobis is an estab-
lished remedy for challenging a criminal conviction. 
[8] ld.-Writ of Error Coram Nobis-Review.-When a state af-
fords a direct or collateral remedy to attack a criminal con-
viction, it cannot invidiously discriminate between rich and 
poor; and an indigent defendant is entitled to an adequate 
record on appeal, not only from a judgment of conviction, but 
from the denial of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. 
[9] ld.-Writ of Error Coram Nobis-Appointment of Counsel-
Indigent Derendants.-The questions that may be raised on 
coram nobis are as crucial as those on direct appeal, for which 
an indigent defendant is entitled as of right to appointed 
counsel the first time, and it may not be held thr.t appointmcnt 
of counsel for an indigent defendant in coram nobis rests solely 
in the court's discretion. (Disapproving People v. Fowler, 
175 Cal.App.2d 808 [346 P.2d 792J; People v. Waldo,224 Cal. 
App.2d 542 [36 Cal.Rptr. 868J; People v. Blevins, 222 Cal. 
App.2d 801 [35 Cal.Rptr. 438, 36 Cal.Rptr. 199], and People v. 
Miller, 219 Cal.App.2d 124 [32 Cal.Rptr. 660] to the extent 
that they suggest that the appointment of counsel is always 
discretionary, and People v. Romano, 223 Cal.App.2d 216 [35 
CaI.Rptr.756].) 
[10] Id.-Writ of Error Coram NobiS-ApPointment of Counsel-
Indigent Defendants.-A state may adopt reasonable standards 
to govern the right to counsel in coram nobis proceedings. 
[11] ld.-Writ of Error Coram Nobis-Appointment of Counsel-
Indigent Defendants.-Standards governing the right to counsel 
in coram nobis proceedings may preclude absolute equality to 
the indigent, but absolute equality is not required; only in-
vidious discrimination denies equal protection. 
[12&,12b] ld. - Writ of Error Coram Nobis - Appointment of 
Counsel-Indigent Pefendants.-As a condition to the appoint-
ment of counsel, an indigent petitioner for a writ of coram 
nobis must allege with particularity the facts upon which he 
would have a final judgment overturned and must disclose fully 
his reasons for any delay in the presentation of those facts; 
and in the absence of adequate factual allegations stating a 
prima .facie case, counsel need not be appointed either in the 
trial court or on appeal from a sUlllmary denial of relief in that 
court. 
[13] Id.-Writ of Error Coram Nobis-Appointment of Counsel-
Indigent Defendants.-Whcn an indigent petitioner for a writ 
of coram nobis has stated facts sufficient to satisfy the court 
that a hesrin:; i~ requirro, hi~ claim clm no longer be treateo 
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as frivolous, and he is entitled to have counsel appointed t-;)'\ 
represent him. If relief is denied after the hearing by the trial \ 
court, he is entitled to counsel on appeal, but if appointed; 
counsel conscientiously concludes that there are no meritorious! 
grounds of appeal, and the appellate court from its review is ': 
satisfied that counsel's assessment of the record is correct, 
it need not appoint ot1er counsel. 
[14] Id.-Writ of Error Coram Nobis-Grounds-InsanitY.-The 
trial court did not err in setting for hearing a petition for writ 
of coram nobis where defendant admitted shooting two police 
officers but alleged that he was then "hopped up" on benzedrine 
and legally insane and that he did not present the defense of 
insanity, being insane when he pleaded guilty, where these 
allegations were supported by sworn statements from asso-
ciates, and where the prison p~ychiatrist concluded that de-
fendant suffered from toxic psychosis as a result of overdoses 
of benzedrine and that the toxic state existed prior to and 
during the act for which defendant was convieted. 
[15] Id.-Writ of Error Coram Nobis-Grounds-Insanity.-Alle-
gations, if true, that defendant was legally insane at the time 
of his crime and that he failed to present the defense of in-
sanity, being insane at the time he pleaded guilty, meet the 
requirements for a writ of coram nobis. 
[16] Id.-Writ of Error Coram Nobis-Time for Application-
Diligence.-It could not be said that defendant lacked diligence 
in discovering the facts on which he relied for relief where he 
may have failed to present facts supporting an insanity plea 
through no fault of his own, and his petition for a writ of 
coram nobis was presented within 10 months after his judg-
ment of conviction. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Orange 
County denying a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. 
Robert P. Kneeland, Judge. Reversed with directions. 
Paul Ackerman, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Defendant and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attorneys General, 
William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and George 
J. Roth, peputy A ttorney General, for Plaintiff and Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In < February, 1962, defendant was 
charged by information with two assaults with a deadly 
weapon upon peace officers engaged in the performance of 
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their duties.1 (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)~) The trial court 
appointed the public defender to represent him, and he en-
tered pleas of guilty. On March 9, the court entered a judg-
ment of conviction and sentenced him to prison. The trial 
judge and the district attorney recommended psychiatric care. 
(Pen. Code, § 1203.01.) Defendant did not appeal. 
In January 1963, defendant, in propria persona, mailed a 
'petition for writ of error coram nobis to the trial court.2 The 
petition alleges that defendant was insane at the time of the 
offense, but did not present this defense because he was also 
insane at the time of the plea. Defendant requested that he 
be present at the hearing and that counsel be appointed to 
represent him. The trial court filed the petition in August 
and denied these requests. It did not, however, deny the peti-
tion summarily, but set it for hearing. Defendant then wrote 
to the trial court repeating his requests, but no action was 
taken on this letter. 
The hearing was .continued from time to time until October 
25, 1963. During this period the public defender appeared 
for defendant on three occasions when continuances were 
ordered, and assisted him in filing affidavits and a report of 
an examination by the prison psychiatrist. The court refused, 
however, to appoint the public defender to represent defend-
ant. The People filed affidavits and a memorandum of points 
and authorities in opposition to the petition. When the peti-
tion finally came on for hearing, defendant was neither pres-
ent nor represented by counsel. The court complimented the 
deputy district attorney on his memorandum of points and· 
authorities and denied defendant's petition. Defendant ap-
pealed, and the District Court of Appeal for the Fourth Ap-
pellate District appointed counsel to represent him. There-
after it reversed the order and remanded the case to the trial 
court with instructions to appoint counsel to represent de-
fendant in the coram nobis proceedings. We granted the 
Attorney General's petition for hearing to consider recurring 
questions involving the right to counsel in coram nobis cases. 
(See People v. Fowler, 175 Cal.App.2d 808 [346 P.2d 792] ; 
People v. Waldo, 224 Cal.App.2d 542 [36 Cal.Rptr. 868]; 
lCharges, based on the same ~vents, that defendant committed two 
assaults with intent t.o kill (Pen. Code, § 217), were dismissed. The 
information also charged, and defendant admitted, a prior felony con-
viction. 
2In California, this petition is the equivalent of a motion to vacate 
the judgment. (See People v. Tuthill, 32 Cal.2d 819, 821 [198 P.2d 
505].) 
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People v. Romano, 223 CalApp.2d 216 [35 Cal.Rptr. 756J; 1 
People v. Blevins, 222 Cal.App.2d 801 [35 Cal.Rptr. 438, 36 . 
Cal.Rptr. 191]; People v. Miller, 219 Cal.App.2d 124 [32. 
Cal.Rptr. 660].) 1 
[la] The writ of coram nobis is granted only when three· 
requirements are met. (1) Petitioner must "show that some 
fact existed which, without any fault or negligence on his 
part, was not presented to the court at the trial on the merits, ; 
and which if presented would have prevented the rendition . 
of the judgment. " (People v. M en dei, 28 Cal.2d 686, 688 [171 
P.2d 425] ; accord, People v. Tuthill, 32 Cal.2d 819, 821 [198 
P.2d 505] ; People v. Reid, 195 Cal. 249, 255 [232 P. 457, 86 
A.L.R. 1485].) (2) Petitioner must also show that the "newly 
discovered evidence . . . [does not go] to the merits of issues 
tried; issues of fact, once adjudicated, even though incor-
rectly, cannot be reopened except on motion for new trial" 
(People v. Tuthill, 82 Cal.2d 819, 822 [198 P.2d 505] ; accord, 
In re L£ndley, 29 Cal2d 709, 725-726 [177 P.2d 918] ; People 
v. Paysen, 13 Cal.App. 896, 402 [11 P.2d 431].) [2] This 
second requirement applies even though the evidence in ques-
tion is not discovered until after the time for moving for a 
new trialhas elapsed or the motion has been denied. (People 
v. Reid, 195 Cal. 249, 258 [282 P. 457, 86 A.L.R. 1485]; 
PeopZe v. Coz, 18 Cal.App.2d 288, 286 [68 P.2d 849].) 
[lb] (8) Petitioner "must show that the facts upon which he 
relies were not known to him and could not in the exercise of 
due diligence have been discovered by him at any time sub-
stantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ . 
. • ." (PeopZe v. Shorts, 82Cal.2d 502, 518 [197 P.2d 880] ; 
accord, People v. W dch, 61 Ca1.2d 786, 791 [40 Cal.Rptr. 
288, 394 P.2d 926].) 
In view of these strict requirements, it will often be readily 
apparent from the petition and the court's own records that 
a petition for coram nobis is without merit and should there- . 
fore be summarily denied. [3] When, however, facts have 
been alleged with sufficient particularity (see In re Swain, 
34 Ca1.2d 300, 804 [209 P.2d 798]) to show that there are 
substantial legal or factual issues on which availability of 
the writ turns, the court must set the matter for hearing. 
[4] These issues may be decided on the basis of memoranda 
of points and authorities, affidavits, and other written re-
ports. If the court deems additional procedures necessary 
to a correct determination of the issues, it may also require 
the presence of petitioner and other witnesses, and conduct 
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the hearing like an ordinary trial. (People v. Gennaitte, 127 
Cal.App.2d 544, 548-549 [274 P.2d 169]; People v. Kirk, 
76 Cal.App.2d 496, 498 [173 P.2d 367].) [5] Neither the 
United States Constitution nor California law, however, re-
quires that the hearing be conducted as a formal trial. (Hysler 
v. Flor1c,a, 315 U.S. 411, 417 [62 S.Ct. 688, 86 L.Ed. 932]; 
Taylor v. Alabama, 335 u.s. 252, 263 [68 S.Ct. 1415, 92 
L.Ed. 1935]; see People v. Adamson, 34 Ca1.2d 320, 330 
[210 P.2d 13].) It is in the light of this procedural back-
ground that we must determine when counsel should be ap-
pointed to represent an indigent petitioner. 
The Attorney General contends that coram nobis is a civil 
remedy and that therefore appointment of counsel is not 
mandatory. (See People v. Fowler, 175 Cal.App.2d 808, 810 
[346 P.2d 792].) [6,7] Whatever the label, however, coram 
7lobis "must be regarded as part of the proceedings in the 
criminal case ... " (In re Paiva, 31 Ca1.2d 503, 510 [190 
P.2d 604]), and it is an established remedy for challenging a 
criminal conviction. (See id, at p. 505; In re Horowitz, 33 
Ca1.2d 534, 537 [203 P.2d 513]; 51 Cal.L.Rev. 970, 978.) 
[8] It is now settled that whenever a state affords a direct 
or collateral remedy to attack a criminal conviction, it cannot 
invidiously discriminate between rich and poor. An indigent 
defendant is entitled to an adequate record on appeal not 
only from a judgment of conviction (Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12 [76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891, 55 A.L.R.2d 
1055); Eskridge v. Washington State Board etc. Paroles, 357 
U.S. 214 [78 S.Ct. 1061, 2 L.Ed.2d 1269}; Draper v. Wash-
ington, 372 U.S. 487 [83 S.Ct. 774, 9 L.Ed.2d 899], but 
from the denial of a petition for a writ of coram nobis (Lane 
v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 [83 S.Ct. 768, 9 L.Ed.2d 892]; see 
McCrary v. Indiana, 36:,1: U.S. 277 [80 S.Ct. 1410,4 L.Ed.2d 
1706]). [9] Although the United States Supreme Court 
has not held that due process or equal protection requires 
appointment of counsel to present collateral attacks on 
convictions, it has held that counsel must be appointed to 
represent the d,.efendant on his first appeal as of right. (Doug-
las v. California, 372 U.S. 353 [83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 
811].) Since the questions that may be raised on coram 
nobis are as crucial as those that may be raised on direct 
appeal, the Douglas case precludes our holding that appoint-
ment of counsel in coram nobis proceedings rests solely in the 
discretion of the court. 
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[10] A state may, however, adopt reasonable standards to I, 
govern the right to counsel in coram nobis proceedings. 
[11] These standards may preclude absolute equality to thel 
indigent, but, as the United States Supreme Court pointed 
out in the Douglas case,absolute equality is not required; 
only "invidious discrimination" denies equal protection. 
(Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-357 [83 S.Ct. 
814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811].) [12] Thus, in In re Nash, 61 
Ca1.2d 491, 496 [39 Cal.Rptr. 205, 393 P.2d 405], we held 
that an appellant was not subject to invidious discrimination 
when neither his appointed counsel nor the District Court of 
Appeal could discover a meritorious ground of appeal and the 
court refused to appoint another counsel to represent him. 
In habeas corpus cases we require a convicted defendant to 
allege with particularity the facts upon which he would have 
a final judgment overturned and to disclose fully his reasons 
for any delay in the presentation of those facts. (In re 
Swain, 34 Ca1.2d 300, 304 [209 P.2d 793].) We then examine 
his allegations in the light of any matter of record pertaining 
to his case (see California Rules of Court, rule 60) to deter-
mine whether a hearing should be ordered. We recognize 
that these rules, applicable as well to petitions for coram nobis, 
place indigent petitioners in a less advantageous position 
than those with funds to retain counsel and employ investi-
gators. It bears emphasis, however, that the ordinary proc-
esses of trial and appeal are presumed to result in valid 
adjudications. Unless we make the filing of adequately de-
tailed factual allegations stating a prima facie case a condi-
tion to appointing counsel, there would be no alternative but 
to require the state to appoint counsel for every prisoner who 
asserts that there may be some possible ground for challenging 
his conviction. Neither the United States Constitution nor 
the California Constitution compels that alternative. Ac-
cordingly, in the absence of adequate factual allegations stat-
ing a prima facie case, counsel need not be appointed either' 
in the trial court or on appeal from a summary denial of relief 
in that court. 
[13] When, however, an indigent petitioner has stated 
facts sufficient to satisfy the court that a hearing is required, 
his claim can no longer be treated as frivolous and he is en-
titled to have counsel appointed to represent him. If re-
lief is denied after the hearing, he is entitled to counsel on 
appeal subject to the limitations set forth in the Nash case, 
supra, 61 Ca1.2d 491, for the issues involved may be as sub-
) 
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stantial as those that may be raised on appeal from a judg-
ment of conviction.8 
[14] In the present case, the trial court found that a hear-
ing was required. Defendant admits shooting two police 
officers who were questioning him in connection with his 
abandoned car, but contends that he was "hopped up" on 
benzedrine tablets and that he had slept for only brief periods 
during the preceding nine days. Hence, defendant contends, 
lle was legally insane at the time of the crime. He alleges 
that he failed to present the defense of insanity because he 
was also insane at the time that he pleaded guilty. These 
allegations are supported by sworn statements from associates 
that defendant customarily drugged himself heavily with 
benzedrine and that he suffered from delusions of police 
persecution. The report of the prison psychiatrist also con-
cludes that defendant was suffering from " toxic psychosis 
because of massive overdoses of benzedrine and that this toxic 
state existed prior to and during the acts for which he was 
convicted. 
Although the psychiatrist's report casts some doubt on 
whether the effects of the drug were present at the time de-
fendant pleaded guilty, we cannot say that the trial court 
erred in setting the petition for hearing. [15] Defendant's 
allegations, if true, would meet the requirements for a writ of 
coram nobis. His legal sanity at the time of the crime is a 
material question that was neither put in issue nor tried. (Pen. 
Code, § 1016; People v. Welch, 61 Cal.2d 786, 794 [40 Cal. 
Rptr. 238, 394 P.2d 926J.) [16] Furthermore, if he was in:. 
capable of participating in the formulation of his defense, 
defendant may have failed to present facts supporting an in-
sanity plea through no fault of his own. Finally, the petition 
was presented witllin 10 months from the judgment, and we 
cannot say that defendant was not diligent in discovering the 
facts upon which he relies. 
The order denying coram nobis is reversed Rnd the cause 
8To the extent that People v. Fowler, 175 Cal.App.2d 808 [346 P.2d 
792], People v. Waldo, 224 Cal.App.2d 542 [36 Cal.Rptr. 868], People 
v. BlcviftB, 222 Ca1.App.2d 801 {S5 Cal.Rptr. 438, 36 Cal.Rptr. 199], and 
People v. Miller, 219 Cal.App.2d 124 [32 Cal.Rptr. 660], involved peti· 
tions that did not state facts sum.cient to require a hearing, they are 
not inconsistent with this opinion. To the extent that they suggest that 
the appointment of eounsel is always discretionary, they are disapproved. 
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remanded with instructions to appoint counsel and proceed 
with a hearing on the merits of the petitiQn. 
, t, 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Burke, i:;, 
and Schauer, J.,. concurred. <, 
